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We extend Lubik and Schorfheide's (2004) likelihood-based estimation of dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models under indeterminacy to encompass a sample
period including both determinacy and indeterminacy by implementing the change-point
methodology (Chib, 1998). The most striking ¯nding about the indeterminacy regime, which
is estimated to coincide with the Great In°ation of the 1970s, is that it exhibits the price
puzzle, in that the in°ation rate rises immediately and in a sustained manner following a
positive interest rate shock. Thus, the price puzzle might have been a genuine phenomenon
under indeterminacy, rather than a false ¯nding to be excised through speci¯cation search
and parameter restrictions.
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written.I. Introduction
In this paper, we extend Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)'s [denoted LS (2004)] likelihood-based
estimation of monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models under indeter-
minacy to encompass a sample period including both determinacy and indeterminacy regimes
where the transitions are treated as a change-point process. This approach lets the data speak as
to when the indeterminacy regime took place in order to characterize the indeterminacy-speci¯c
parameters without including extraneous observations from the 1960s, for example. In the con-
text of the monetary DSGE model we study, indeterminacy results for certain parameter values
of the monetary policy rule. Indeterminacy refers to the inability to calculate a unique rational
expectations forecast error given a set of structural shocks; in other words, there is room for
self-ful¯lling expectations and responses to extrinsic sunspot variables.
Our estimates suggest that an indeterminacy regime held between 1972 and 1982 in the
United States. A key feature that we ¯nd in the indeterminacy regime is an impulse response
function for in°ation to an interest rate shock that exhibits the price puzzle. The price puzzle
occurs when an interest rate shock is followed immediately by a sustained increase in the in°ation
rate. Because we know of no previous likelihood-based estimated DSGE model that has implied
the price puzzle, we discuss the price puzzle in some detail.1
A fundamental tenet of monetary policymaking and in°ation control is that a surprise in-
crease in the short-term interest rate will lower the path of the price level from what it otherwise
would have been. Thus, it has been disconcerting that impulse response functions from many
identi¯ed vector autoregressive models (VARs) have exhibited the price puzzle, as ¯rst illus-
trated in Sims (1992). Hansen (2004) showed that it is not easy to explain away the price puzzle
through the inclusion of additional variables, such as commodity prices. The commodity price
\¯x" does not work for all sub-sample periods, especially the pre-1980 period.
The conventional response to the price puzzle is that empirical ¯ndings of the price puzzle are
necessarily false readings and a sure sign of a speci¯cation problem in the empirical model that
generated such a result. Until now estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
models have not implied a price puzzle (Castelnuovo and Surico, 2006). Partly to avoid the
price puzzle, Uhlig (2006) introduced a way to ensure that identi¯ed VARs do not contradict
1Christiano et al. (2005) introduce staggered wage contracts and other nominal rigidities and obtain an impulse
response such that the immediate response to a positive interest rate shock is higher prices, but the e®ect only
lasts about 10 periods before a permanent decrease in prices takes hold.
2the consensual view of how the economy responds to shocks: posit `sensible' sign restrictions on
impulse response functions and make sure that the only admissible parameter values in Bayesian
estimation are ones that obey those sign restrictions.
An alternative view of the price puzzle is that it could be a genuine phenomenon. That is,
there could be circumstances in which positive interest rate shocks lead to increases in the in°a-
tion rate. In particular, an economy under indeterminacy could exhibit the price puzzle. Lubik
and Schorfheide (2003), denoted LS (2003), presented the necessary tools for likelihood-based
estimation of a DSGE model under indeterminacy. Thus, only recently have macroeconomists
been able to estimate a DSGE model under both determinacy and indeterminacy and calculate
posterior odds that a given sample period pertained to indeterminacy [LS (2004)]. The empiri-
cal results in LS (2004) hint at the possibility of a relationship between indeterminacy and the
price puzzle: \According to our pre-Volcker estimates under Prior 1, an increase in the nominal
rate can have [eventually] a slightly in°ationary e®ect...indeterminacy can alter the propagation
of fundamental shocks" [LS (2004), p. 207]. It is important to note here that the LS (2004)
impulse response did not show the price puzzle, although it suggests the possibility. To exhibit
the price puzzle, the impact response of the interest rate shock on in°ation has to be positive.
Precisely because the model estimated by LS (2004) does not exhibit the price puzzle, Castel-
nuovo and Surico (2006) took the model and parameter estimates from LS (2004), simulated
data, estimated structural VARs and showed that VAR-identi¯ed impulse response functions
displayed the price puzzle. Castelnuovo and Surico's exercise was aimed at strengthening the
case that the price puzzle was a false ¯nding.
We show that, by using a di®erent (and we suggest a reasonable) di®use prior on the
indeterminacy-speci¯c parameters that govern how the dynamic response of the economy to
fundamental shocks di®ers under indeterminacy, that the estimated monetary DSGE model
generates the price puzzle. Thus, we suggest that the price puzzle is not necessarily a false
¯nding that pertains only to mis-speci¯ed VARs. We cannot, of course, rule out the possibil-
ity that the ¯nding of indeterminacy is a result of model mis-speci¯cation, as LS (2004) also
noted. Beyer and Farmer (2007) argue that if a model is lacking autoregressive dynamics that
are present in the data, then one could improve the ¯t by falsely choosing parameter values
from the indeterminacy region, since indeterminacy can enrich the model's dynamic response to
fundamental shocks.2 One argument we have against this interpretation of our results, however,
2Beyer and Farmer (2007) provide a simple example where a determinate model with richer dynamics is
3is that if the DSGE model we use were fundamentally lacking in dynamics, then it would be
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Figure 1. The tendency of the federal funds rate to precede changes in in°ation in the same direction during the
1970s.
To see why the Great In°ation of the 1970s is associated with the price puzzle in U.S. data,
it is su±cient to look at a plot of the federal funds rate and in°ation. Figure 1 highlights the
tendency of the fed funds rate to precede movements in in°ation in the same direction between
the early 1970s and early 1980s. Accompanying Figure 1, we also provide a preview of our
results in Figure 2. Our estimate of the indeterminacy period corresponds almost exactly with
the 1972 to 1982 period indicated in Figure 1. The draws of the determinacy regimes make clear
in Figure 2 that the transition from the ¯rst determinacy regime to indeterminacy took place in
a relatively narrow window between late 1971 and early 1973. The timing of the transition from
indeterminacy back to a determinate regime is even more clear-cut: between late 1981 and late
1982. Consequently, the subset of data used to characterize the economy under indeterminacy
observationally equivalent to a model with indeterminacy.







Figure 2. Posterior probability of regimes: solid red line denotes the ¯rst determinacy regime D1, dash-dot
yellow indicates indeterminacy regime Ind, and solid blue line marks the second determinacy regime D2.
is well de¯ned and does not include extraneous observations from the 1960s, as samples that
use a pre-Volcker break do, such as LS (2004). In the empirical results section, we will further
characterize the indeterminacy regime with respect to the price puzzle in the form of impulse
response functions.
With this set of regime dates, our article provides a new perspective on the Great In°ation
of the 1970s, which is useful because the Great In°ation poses the same sort of challenge for
monetary policy that the Great Depression did for market economies: How did things go so
wrong for such a long time?3 Nelson (2005) and Romer and Romer (2002) lay the blame for
the Great In°ation on the Monetary Neglect Hypothesis, which is that monetary policymak-
ers attributed in°ation to nonmonetary cost-push factors, such as commodity prices and wage
settlements. This explanation struggles to cover what was essentially a decade-long problem,
however, especially since it requires policymakers to ignore well-understood Monetarist doctrine
that in°ation is a monetary phenomenon. Nelson (2005) suggests that misperceptions regarding
potential output during the 1970s, documented in Orphanides (2003), could have served as a
3Cole and Ohanian (2002) study the ability of standard macroeconomic models to simulate a Great Depression
event.
5propagation mechanism for monetary policy neglect and mistakes in order to explain the length
of the Great In°ation.
We propose an explanation for the duration of the Great In°ation that is based on indeter-
minacy. As LS (2003) note, one can view indeterminacy as a circumstance that triggers belief
shocks that alter agent forecasts in a manner consistent with rational expectations. Our ¯nding
of the price puzzle under indeterminacy is consistent with the notion that, under indeterminacy,
people viewed an interest rate shock as simply another cost-push shock, so the belief was that
in°ation ought to rise. For this interpretation, the wording of Lubik and Schorfheide is cru-
cial: indeterminacy triggers revisions to beliefs such that the economy responds di®erently to
fundamental shocks and not just sunspots.
Nelson (2005), however, dismisses indeterminacy as a factor in explaining the Great In°ation
based on the the contention that it would be a strange coincidence if sunspot shocks occurred
at the same time with the same sign across many countries.4 In our explanation, indeterminacy
plays a crucial role, but we do not claim that sunspot shocks directly account for high in°ation.
Instead, we suggest that the way indeterminacy might alter beliefs and the economy's response
to fundamental shocks is largely an empirical issue that we set out to investigate.
Our indeterminacy explanation for the duration of the Great In°ation is meant to be com-
plementary to explanations based on learning. Sargent et al. (2005) assume that monetary
policymakers knew the structure of the economy and the workings of the in°ation process, but
persistent misperceptions (even in a learning context) regarding the current parameter values
led policymakers to pursue in°ationary policies inadvertently. Cogley and Sargent (2005) and
Bullard and Eusepi (2005) view the Great In°ation as the outcome of a learning process about
structural change. Primiceri (2005) explains the duration of the Great In°ation by focusing on a
backward-looking Keynesian model in which policymakers would gauge that disin°ation would
be very costly.
The remainder of the paper consists of: a presentation of the DSGE model with change
points; a discussion of estimation of likelihood-based models under indeterminacy, as developed
in LS (2003), with an extension to regime change points; our use of a di®use prior, which we
show leads to the price puzzle|in fact, we show that a restrictive prior is necessary to avoid the
price puzzle under indeterminacy; ¯nally, a discussion of the results vis-a-vis the price puzzle.
Section IV E discusses the drawbacks of sub-sample estimation, which LS (2004) used as an
4Bullard and Singh (2006) discuss worldwide transmission of endogenous volatility due to indeterminacy.
6alternative to regime changes.
II. A Monetary DSGE Model
We added a time-varying in°ation target to the standard New Keynesian monetary model
(Woodford, 2003) because we did not want to slant the evidence in favor of indeterminacy
by forcing the in°ation target to remain constant. The Woodford model is widely considered a
benchmark in the monetary DSGE literature and therefore serves as a good starting point for
the incorporation of determinacy change-points. With the time-varying target in place, we take
the log-linearized version of the Woodford model and express the state variables as deviations
from their steady state levels:
e yt = Ete yt+1 ¡ ¿( ~ Rt ¡ Et~ ¼t+1) + gt (1)
~ ¼t = ¯Et~ ¼t+1 + ·(e yt ¡ zt)
~ Rt = ½R ~ Rt¡1 +
+(1 ¡ ½R)[~ ¼T
t + Ã1(~ ¼t ¡ ~ ¼T
t ) + Ã2(e yt ¡ zt)] + "R;t
~ ¼T
t = ½¼~ ¼T
t¡1 + "¼;t
gt = ½ggt¡1 + "g;t
zt = ½zzt¡1 + "z;t
where y is detrended log output, ¼ is in°ation, R is the nominal federal funds interest rate, and
tilde denotes percentage deviation from the corresponding steady-state value.
The ¯rst two structural equations in the model emerge from general equilibrium theory:
the ¯rst equation is the intertemporal Euler (I-S) equation derived from the household's opti-
mization problem, where ¿ > 0 denotes the intertemporal substitution elasticity and the second
equation is the expectational Phillips curve with slope · obtained from production sector's pro¯t
maximization condition, where ¯ denotes the household's discount factor. The third equation
represents a Taylor-type monetary policy rule with interest-rate smoothing. The coe±cients Ã1
and Ã2 re°ect the strength of Fed's reaction to in°ation and the output gap, respectively. The
fourth equation describes the AR(1) dynamics of the in°ation target ¼T
t .5 The last two equa-
tions describe the autoregressive demand shock process g and technology shock process z. The
5We will assume that in°ation target follows AR(1) process with autocorrelation coe±cient ½¼ = 0:85 and
standard deviation ¾¼ = 0:05 to avoid concerns related to the identi¯cation of these parameters.
7fundamental shock " consists of the monetary policy shock "R, demand shock "g, technology
shock "z, and in°ation target shock "¼.
Let ¼¤ and r¤ denote annualized steady-state values for ¼ and R ¡ ¼, respectively. Let





i=0;½¼;½R;½g;½zg. We then have a vector of
rational expectations forecast errors
´t = [e yt ¡ Et¡1e yt; ~ ¼t ¡ Et¡1~ ¼t]0;
the vector of observed macro data
yt = [e yt;¼t;Rt]0;
and the state vector
®t = [e yt;e ¼t; e Rt;e ¼T
t ;Et[yt+1];Et[¼t+1];gt;zt]0
III. A General DSGE Model with Multiple Change Points
Most linearized rational expectations models, including eq. (1) can be written in the following
state-space form:
yt = A(µ) + B(µ)®t (2)
¡0(µ)®t = ¡1(µ)®t¡1 + ª(µ)"t + ¦(µ)´t;
where yt is a vector of macro data observed without measurement noise; coe±cient matrices
A(µ);B(µ);¡0(µ);¡1(µ);ª(µ);¦(µ) are functions of the underlying DSGE model's parameter
vector µ; the state vector ®t contains a combination of observed and latent elements, such as
endogenous variables and their expectations; "t is a normally distributed vector of fundamental
shocks; and ´t is a vector of rational expectations forecast errors.
The model speci¯cation in eq. (2) with time-invariant coe±cients is at odds, however, with
the recent empirical ¯ndings by Clarida et al. (2000), LS (2004), and Beyer and Farmer (2007),
which show strong evidence of switches between active and passive monetary policy rules by
the Federal Reserve. In this model, passive monetary policy induces indeterminacy, whereupon
8multiple equilibria exist and the macro dynamics can di®er substantively from the corresponding
determinacy regime.
In this paper, we consider a multiple change-point model for time-varying determinacy
regimes, denoted by a regime indicator variable st, which enables us to estimate most model
parameters using data from the full-sample period. Let us assume that the sample starts with
determinacy D1 and the determinacy state variable s0 = 0. Then, at some time point t1 there is
one structural break to indeterminacy Ind: st1 = 1, and then at time t2 there is a second break
to a new determinacy D2: st2 = 2. We assume that the determinacy transitions cannot occur in
the reverse direction, i.e. transitions from st = 2 to st+1 = 1 are impossible. A standard Markov
switching model, in contrast, does not rule out a return to previous states. In a change-point
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where pij = Pr(st = jjst¡1 = i).
Consider the monetary DSGE model where the only regime-dependent parameters are the
coe±cients in a contemporaneous Taylor-type monetary policy rule:
Rt = Ã
(st)
1 ¼t + Ã
(st)
2 yt + "R;t (4)
where the federal funds rate Rt is set according to the level of contemporaneous in°ation ¼t





2 are selected by monetary policymakers. The econometrician's





i;j = 1;2, are central to our inference problem. As with most regime-switching models, we
take switches to be exogenous events. In the DSGE context, the transition dates occur when
the econometrician ¯nds evidence that agents in the economy began forming their expectations
based on a di®erent monetary policy rule. Due to the nature of these determinacy regimes, our
change-point model does not su®er from the \label switching" problem because here the states
are identi¯ed not simply by labels but by indeterminacy versus determinacy.
9The linearized DSGE model in (2) can be extended to allow for regime-dependent coe±cients:
yt = A + B®t (5)
¡0(µ(st))®t = ¡1(µ(st))®t¡1 + ª(µ(st))"t + ¦(µ(st))´t;
where the dependence of coe±cient matrices in the ¯rst (measurement) equation on a state-
dependent parameter vector µ(st) is suppressed in order to emphasize the fact that both A and
B depend only on the state-invariant portion of the parameter vector.
If macroeconomic agents faced an inference problem of endogenously learning about the
regimes in this dynamic environment, then rational expectations formation would no longer
be linear and the solution method we propose below would no longer apply. Therefore, it is
important to point out that in this paper, when forming rational expectations about the saddle
path of the economy, agents accept regime changes as completely exogenous events and assume
that the current regime will last inde¯nitely.6 It is only the econometrician who is assumed to
have to infer the timing of the breaks. Recent work on DSGE models with Markov switching
parameters has derived valid forward-looking solutions (Dueker et al. (2006), Davig and Leeper
(2007), Davig and Leeper (2006), Farmer et al. (2006)) but the model solution methods to date
have not been fast enough to be used in the estimation of DSGE models, so we leave this topic
for future work.
The model of eq. (5) represents a set of simultaneous equations. Thus, an econometrician
must \solve" the DSGE model, i.e. ¯nd a way to express ´t as a function of "t. Sims (2002)
provided precise necessary and su±cient conditions to distinguish between three possible cases,
depending on the parameters in the transition equation: a) such a function might be a deter-
ministic one-to-one map, which would correspond to determinacy; b) there might be multiple
solutions (indeterminacy), in which case LS (2003) suggest a simple (linear) model for ´t which
uniquely determines it as a function of both structural (fundamental) shocks "t and a sunspot
shock; c) no solution.
We solve the linearized DSGE model in (5) and put it in Gaussian state-space form
yt = A + B®t (6)
6This assumption is not unique to the change-point model. Any sequence of sub-sample estimates, including




using the Generalized Schur (QZ) decomposition of (¡0(µ(st));¡1(µ(st))) to avoid possible
problems with inverting ¡0(µ(st)); the column space spanning conditions in Sims (2002) are
used to rule out \no solution" parameter con¯gurations. Then, following LS (2003), we apply
the singular value decomposition to the matrix Q2¦ (Q from the QZ decomposition, where
Q2 uses only the rows of Q corresponding to unstable eigenvalues and ¦ from eq. (2)) .
Proposition 1 from LS (2004) shows how to solve for ´t as a function of shocks "t (augmented by
sunspot shocks under indeterminacy) and coe±cients ~ M, which control the additional impact
the fundamental shocks have on ®t under indeterminacy. Therefore, the transition equation
coe±cient matrices ¡¤
1(µ(st));¡¤
2(µ(st); ~ M) come from the output of a numerical (non-analytic)
`DSGEsolve' function of the original model parameters µ(st), coe±cients ~ M, and determinacy
state st at each time t.7
One of the key features of the model solution under indeterminacy is that the forecast errors
depend on parameters in a vector ~ M, which consists of additional free parameters that can be
used to ¯t the data. The forecast errors under indeterminacy take the following form (see LS
(2003), LS (2004) and Appendix A for de¯nitions of these matrices):
y ¡ E[y] = (¡V1D¡1
11 U0
1Q2ª + V2 ~ M)" + V2³ (7)
Because the singular value decomposition results in V having orthonormal rows, the e®ects on
the forecast errors ´ from fundamental shocks " are orthogonal to the e®ects from the sunspot
shock, ³ when ~ M = 0. The rational expectations solution does not require orthogonality between
the e®ects of fundamental and sunspot shocks (the partial derivatives), however.8 Thus the
parameters in ~ M enter the model under indeterminacy and control the cross product between
the e®ects on forecast errors between the fundamental shocks and the sunspot shock. The prior
that one chooses for ~ M re°ects prior beliefs about the cross product between the e®ects of
fundamental and sunspot shocks on forecast errors. As we discuss below, the value of Mr, in
particular, is critical in leading to the price puzzle or not under indeterminacy.
As mentioned above and in greater detail in Appendix A, the solution of the DSGE model
7See Appendix A for details.
8Note that the e®ects of the shocks on the forecast errors are partial derivatives of eq. 7 and are not random
variables. It is therefore appropriate to discuss whether these e®ects consist of orthogonal matrices but not to
refer to them as having correlations because they are not random variables.
11involves a singular value decomposition. The singular value decomposition is subject to a sign
normalization, but under determinacy the sign normalization does not matter because V1D¡1
11 U0
1
from eq. (7) is invariant to the sign normalization. Under indeterminacy, the sign normalization
matters because V2 is not invariant to the sign normalization. This normalization can present
a problem if, for small changes in the parameter values, the singular value decomposition pro-
cedure switches from one sign normalization to the other. If such a sign switch takes place,
it could be accommodated by a corresponding change in the sign of the ~ M coe±cients. We
conjecture that a consistent normalization to prevent sign °ipping on the sunspot shock was
implicitly accomplished in LS (2004) when the prior for ~ M was centered at a point that would
imply continuity of the impulse response function at the boundary between the determinacy
and indeterminacy regions of the parameter space. But this prior also goes a long way towards
ruling out the price puzzle in the indeterminacy regime because, for the price puzzle to hold
under indeterminacy, the sign of the impulse response on impact has to di®er from that in the
determinacy regime.9
We chose to focus on a prior centered at ~ M = 0. LS (2003, p. 279) note that at this value,
the prior belief espoused is that the e®ect on the forecast errors of the fundamental shocks
is orthogonal to the e®ect on the forecast error of the the sunspot shock. Given this mean,
we nevertheless made the prior quite di®use for parameters related to the sunspot shock and
indeterminacy ~ M = fMr;Mg;Mz;M¼g(see Table 2). We accomplish sign identi¯cation in the
singular value decomposition by explicitly requiring that the last element of row vector V2
1£2
is
negative. If it is positive, both elements of V2 are forced to change sign, thereby forcing the last
element always to be negative.
With ~ M in the parameter vector, let the vector sn = fst 2 f0;1;2ggn
t=1 and the matrix
®1:n = (®1;:::;®n) respectively denote determinacy regime states and state variable vector
from the State-Space representation, where n is the number of observations. Let £ = fµ(st =
i); ~ Mg2
i=0 be the collection of model parameters across all determinacy states and use p(¢) to
denote a discrete mass function, while ¼(¢) denotes a density function of some random variable
9We might consider two alternative priors for ~ M that have intuitive appeal: i) that the e®ects on forecast
errors from fundamental and sunspot shocks are orthogonal ( ~ M = 0); ii) continuity of impulse response functions
at the boundary between determinacy and indeterminacy. LS (2004) present a simple example that compares a
univariate model under determinacy and indeterminacy. In their example, however, there is no unstable root under
indeterminacy, so there is no value of ~ M that will orthogonalize the e®ects on the forecast error of the fundamental
shock and the sunspot shock|except in the trivial case where the fundamental shock is eliminated altogether.
Hence their example helps motivate the `continuity' prior without fomenting discussion of the `orthogonal e®ects'
prior.
12with one or more continuous components. In order to estimate our model in (5) given the data
Yn = (y1;:::;yn), our objective is to make draws from the posterior density ¼(£;P;snjYn),
which we accomplish by making draws from the density ¼(£;P;sn;®1:njYn) augmented with
the state variables ®1:n.
Because of the need to infer determinacy regimes, estimation of this model is much more
tractable in a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlos (MCMC) framework. The MCMC algorithm
consists of principal two blocks, detailed in Section B, which can be summarized as follows:
MCMC Algorithm for a General Linear DSGE Model:
1. Initialize £ and sn
2. Sample P;£ and ®1:n from P;£;®1:njYn;sn by drawing
(a) P from PjYn;sn
(b) £ from £jYn;sn (c) ®1:n from ®1:njYn;£;sn
3. Sample sn from snjYn;£;P;®1:n
The ¯rst block in step 2 utilizes the method of composition (Chib, 2001) to produce three sub-
blocks. In Step 2a we sample the unknown elements of the transition probability matrix P using
conjugate prior-posterior update. In Step 2b we draw parameters £ via tailored Metropolis-
Hastings (MH), where the target density is found by integrating out the states f®tgT
t=0 using
the Kalman Filter given determinacy states sn. Every time t the algorithm requires coe±cient
matrices of the transition equation ¡¤
1(µ(st)) and ¡¤
2(µ(st); ~ M), a call to the `DSGEsolve' func-
tion is made. The computational burden can be substantially reduced by recognizing the fact
that within each Kalman ¯lter loop these matrices remain constant until the determinacy state
transition takes place. Similar handling of ¡¤
1(µ(st)) and ¡¤
2(µ(st); ~ M) applies to the remaining
steps in the algorithm. In Step 2c we sample the states using one-period smoothing. Condi-
tioning on the states ®1:n in Step 3 reduces our second block to sampling determinacy states
sn in a regression with multiple change points. The sampler is iterated J times with 10 percent
burn-in.
The resulting Gaussian state-space model with change points in the transition equation
13coe±cients has the following form:10







































In the case of one-degree indeterminacy, we will assume that ´t can be expressed as a linear
combination of the four-dimensional exogenous shock and one-dimensional sunspot shock. Then,
"t is a 5x1 vector of fundamental shocks and the sunspot shock ³t, which is uncorrelated with



























R 0 0 0 0
0 ¾2
g ½gz¾z¾g 0 0
0 ½gz¾z¾g ¾2
z 0 0
0 0 0 ¾2
¼ 0








In order to cast the model in (8) in the same form under both determinacy and indeterminacy,
we make ¡¤
2(µ(st); ~ M) 8x5 for all states by ¯lling in the last column with zeros in case of
determinacy.
IV. The estimated DSGE model of the U.S. economy with multiple change-points
We ¯t the linearized monetary DSGE model described in eq. (1) to U.S. monthly data on
output, in°ation and a short-term nominal interest rate from February 1959 to April 2005. For
10Note that the ¯rst element of the state vector st is an observed data point. The Kalman ¯lter can still be
used for a linear Gaussian state-space model even if some elements of the state vector are observed (Harvey (1981)
p.109). In that case, Kalman ¯lter will produce an updated forecast of the state vector with observed elements
exactly matching the data and zeros in the rows and columns corresponding to such elements in the covariance
matrix. The remaining seven elements are latent, although the second and the third elements are latent only up
to the constants ¼
¤ and r
¤.
14monthly data, industrial production was used as the output series. The model calls for output
to be expressed in terms of an output gap and we follow many previous studies by using the
Hodrick and Prescott (1997) ¯lter to use a stationary measure of an output gap. In°ation
is measured as the annualized log-di®erence in the Personal Consumption Expenditures price
index. The monthly average of the daily e®ective federal funds rate is the short-term interest
rate. In order to check for robustness of our results we used both quarterly and monthly data
sets. Our quarterly data Yn is given by 3x1 vector yt, where t = 1959Q2;:::;2004Q3, while
we obtained all the reported results using monthly data Yn given by 3x1 vector yt, where








The empirical DSGE literature is prone to the \dilemma of absurd parameter estimates" (An
and Schorfheide, 2005). When ¯t to the data, DSGE likelihood functions often peak in regions
of the parameter space that are at odds with our prior perception of the workings of the economy
and other data (¯nancial markets, etc.). This undesirable feature of contemporary DSGE models
has contributed to the wide application of Bayesian methods in this ¯eld and provided some
researchers with justi¯cation for using a prior to shape the posterior. In this paper we take the
issue of prior sensitivity quite seriously. While a certain amount of prior information must enter
the posterior density, many papers fail to strike a proper balance because they impose low prior
density in directions that the likelihood function would favor. Many Bayesian DSGE papers
have over a third of the key structural model parameters with a posterior mean outside or close
to the boundary of the 90 percent prior probability interval. In these cases, prior-sensitivity
analysis would reveal substantial changes in parameter estimates.
We strive for a less-restrictive prior that still delivers reasonable parameter estimates. While
we have used the same functional form as LS (2004) to specify the prior for most parameters
in µ and ­ that appear in both papers, our objective is to come up with a di®use prior for
all parameters, centered at values consistent with the literature. A detailed description of the
prior used in our paper appears in Table 2. All variables are assumed to have independent
prior densities. Gamma prior for the intertemporal substitution elasticity ¿ > 0 is identical
to LS (2004) and is consistent with empirical ¯ndings in other papers. For regime-dependent
11Sims and Zha (2006) also used monthly data for approximately the same period.
15parameters the prior support must lie in the parameter space consistent with the corresponding
determinacy regime. Therefore, Ã
(1)
1 prior has mean 0.4 and standard deviation 0.2, which is




1 has mean 2.3
and standard deviations 1.5 and 0.6, respectively. The Beta prior density for all autocorrelation
coe±cients ½R, ½g, ½z is an obvious choice given the natural restriction of their support to
the unit interval. Because monthly data tends to exhibit more autocorrelation than quarterly
data, we shifted prior densities of these parameters slightly upward, compared to the LS (2004)
prior, keeping standard deviations the same or slightly larger than in their paper. In order
to minimize the prior's impact on the posterior of Phillips curve slope ·, the prior standard
deviation is set to 1.4. The mean of the Gamma prior for · must be larger than its standard
deviation for the moments to exist. Then, a reasonable choice for the prior mean is 1.5 due
to the fact that previous studies ¯nd that the Phillips curve is not very steep. The priors for
steady-state in°ation rate ¼¤ and the real interest rate r¤ are exactly the same as in LS (2004).
For the variances of shocks, we used an inverse gamma prior, as is common for variances. As
discussed above, estimation of DSGE models under indeterminacy is still a relatively new area
of research, so there is little prior information about the magnitude or even the signs of the
fMr;Mg;Mz;M¼g coe±cients. As a result, we assumed a di®use normal prior centered at zero
for all elements of ~ M to have a prior that the e®ects on forecast errors from the sunspot shock
are orthogonal to the e®ects from structural shocks.






ii (1 ¡ pii)(b¡1)
where a À b are selected to yield persistent regimes. We used a = 8, b = 0:1 resulting in
expected regime duration of 81 months, but extensive experimentation showed a low degree
sensitivity of our results to the prior speci¯cation of these parameters.
V. Empirical results with a focus on the price puzzle
Application of a Tailored Metropolis-Hastings (M-H) algorithm (as opposed to Random Walk
MH) in the sampling parameters µ resulted in extremely e±cient MCMC draws of this 23-
parameter block, with autocorrelations among parameter draws that die out rapidly, leading
to low ine±ciency factors shown in Table 2 in the range between 1.5 and 4.7. See Appendix
16B for a description of the Tailored M-H algorithm. Despite the wide application of Random
Walk MH (RW-MH) in estimated DSGE models, our results show that, compared to Tailored
MH, RW-MH takes longer to converge such that, even conditional on the determinacy states sn,
the RW-MH produces substantially higher ine±ciency factors ranging between 92.5 and 169.5.
Therefore we argue in favor of using Tailored MH for estimating DSGE models.
A. Prior-posterior updates and impulse responses
The prior-posterior updates displayed in Figures (3), (4) and (5) are characteristic of a di®use
prior updated with an informative likelihood, resulting in a posterior that is not driven by the
prior.12 Among the ~ M coe±cients, Mr and Mz have particularly informative posteriors. In
robustness checks, it is worth noting that when we move the prior mean for all ~ M coe±cients
to +/-3 (with correspondingly larger standard deviations), the posterior means are still very
close to where we found them when the prior mean is set to zero. The parameter estimates are
in Table 2, but one cannot glean from the reported ~ M coe±cients the overall impact on the
economy of indeterminacy.
Impulse response functions ¯ll this role.13 Figures 6 through 8 provide impulse responses
for the estimated monthly DSGE model. While nothing in the responses to shocks under deter-
minacy goes against intuition, it is interesting to note that, under determinacy, the ¯rst-order
autoregressive structure of equation (6) results mostly in monotonic impulse responses to shocks.
Under indeterminacy, in contrast, the extra response to structural shocks implied by the ~ M co-
e±cients allows for non-monotonic impulse responses with more persistent hump shapes. See
the response of in°ation and the interest rate to an in°ation target shock in Figure 7, for exam-
ple. As noted in LS (2004) and in Beyer and Farmer (2007), higher-order autocorrelation in the
data is a consequence of indeterminacy, and it is higher-order autocorrelation that makes non-
monotonic, hump-shaped impulse responses more prevalent in this model speci¯cation. Beyer
and Farmer (2004) note that, when using a mis-speci¯ed model that incorrectly limits the order
of serial correlation in the state vector, it is possible to bias the coe±cients from such a model
toward indeterminacy. Our ¯nding of a relatively short period of indeterminacy that accounts
for less than a quarter of the entire sample period indicates that the Woodford (2003) model
we use is not so lacking in appropriate dynamics as to lead to ¯nding indeterminacy throughout
12Kernel smoothing was used to produce smoothed plots of marginal posterior densities using MCMC draws
after burn-in.
13See Appendix C for the details on constructing the impulse response functions.
17the sample period. The shift in dynamics under indeterminacy stems from two sources: the
system has one more stable eigenvalue under indeterminacy than under determinacy and, as
noted above, the ~ M coe±cients impart extra response to structural shocks that is absent under
determinacy. But, we ¯nd that in ¯tting the data these extra dynamics are only relevant for the
1972-82 period.
B. Price puzzle and impulse responses
The key ¯nding in our estimates of how the economy behaved under indeterminacy is that
a monetary policy shock was associated with the price puzzle. As highlighted in Figure 6,
the impulse response function of in°ation to a monetary policy (interest rate) shock during the
indeterminacy period was decidedly positive on impact and with persistence, according to the 90
percent probability intervals. Moreover, unlike the corresponding impulse response in LS (2004),
the point estimate of the in°ation response is never negative, even for the ¯rst few months. One
interpretation of the price puzzle, then, is that under indeterminacy people understood that
monetary policy would not be su±ciently active to drive in°ation toward the target rate. In
this context, an interest rate shock became yet another source of cost-push in°ation, with no
countervailing force stemming from a monetary policy rule designed to control in°ation.
To investigate the di®erence between our impulse response function that implied the price
puzzle and the impulse response from LS (2004) that did not, we recalculated impulse responses
at our parameter values except we used values for ~ M that correspond to continuity at the
determinacy boundary. The graph in the center of Figure 9 shows how the price puzzle is
eliminated at this value of ~ M because the impact response is negative, just as it is in LS (2004).
Figure 9 also demonstrates that the `continuity' value of ~ M (given the values of the other
parameters from Table 1) does more than necessary to eliminate the price puzzle by making the
impact response of a positive interest rate shock on in°ation considerably more negative than
seen under either determinacy regime. LS (2004) avoid this overcompensation by the continuity
value of ~ M through the use of a conditional prior. That is, the estimated values of the other
parameters a®ect the prior mean of ~ M. One could argue that the use of a conditional prior
makes the values of the other parameters, such as the slope of the Phillips curve, less structural.
The large, negative impact response of a monetary policy shock on in°ation in Figure 9 results
because the values of ~ M that make the impulse responses continuous at the determinacy bound-
ary are somewhat extreme, with Mr = 4:57;Mg = ¡91:29;Mz = 1:07;M¼ = ¡0:0445, in com-
18parison with the posterior mean values from Table 2, where Mr = ¡0:465;Mg = ¡0:198;Mz =
¡0:19;M¼ = ¡0:23. The value of Mr, in particular, plays a key role in the impact response
of a monetary policy shock. It is natural to ask whether a more moderate value for Mr would
su±ce to remove the price puzzle under indeterminacy (again holding the other parameters at
their posterior means). It turns out that in order to shut down the price puzzle by having the
impact response of a monetary policy shock on in°ation not be positive under indeterminacy,
a necessary condition is Mr > 0:057. In other words, the impact due to non-zero Mr on the
in°ation forecast error from an interest rate shock under indeterminacy must be su±ciently
disin°ationary, which is in the same direction that the sunspot shock pushes in°ation. But, this
sign of Mr di®ers from the sign of the posterior mean value we ¯nd for Mr, which is -0.465.
Moreover, the value of Mr needed to remove the price puzzle under indeterminacy is close to
the upper end of the 90 percent probability interval from Table 2: (-0.973,0.0611). Thus, we
conclude that the price puzzle is a robust feature of the indeterminacy regime.
Nevertheless, because our ¯nding of the price puzzle hinges largely on the fact that the prior
we use di®ers from the continuity prior of LS (2004), we study the boundary region between
determinacy and indeterminacy in some detail. Impulse responses for parameters near the
boundary between determinacy and indeterminacy are particularly interesting for understanding
the di®erence between these two regimes, despite the fact that our parameter estimates for each
regime are many standard deviations away from this boundary.14 Fixing all parameters at their
estimated values, we vary Ã1 to investigate the dynamics of the in°ation impulse response to the
monetary policy shock (see Table 1). An interesting result is that as Ã1 approaches 1 from the left
(indeterminacy), the impulse response monotonically increases, whereas when Ã1 approaches 1
from the right (determinacy), the impulse response monotonically decreases.15 The discontinuity
in the impulse responses at the boundary between the determinacy and indeterminacy still
appears even if all elements of ~ M are set to zero (see asterisk-marked entries in Table 1). The
source of this additional type of discontinuity is that the number of unstable eigenvalues goes
down, so the model has richer dynamics under indeterminacy. LS (2004) centered the prior
(both prior 1 and prior 2) of the indeterminacy coe±cients ~ M at a point that would undo the
discontinuity that would otherwise obtain under indeterminacy.
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15Obviously, this analysis is not a rigorous proof and is presented for motivational purposes only. In order to
approach this question more rigorously, one would have to study the relationship between the elements in impulse




2 do not have a
closed-form solution as a function of µ, which tremendously complicates any such functional analysis.
19Ã1 3.64 1.50 1.20 1.03 1.02 0.98* 0.90* 0.49* 0.98 0.90 0.49
IR -0.342 -0.914 -1.140 -1.324 -1.337 0.643 0.641 0.626 0.859 0.852 0.816
Table 1: This table depicts the impact response on in°ation from a monetary policy shock for
various values of Ã1 holding all other parameters ¯xed at the estimated values. In order to
emphasize that the discontinuity of impulse responses on the boundary between determinacy
and indeterminacy (Ã1 ' 1) is driven not only by non-zero values of ~ M but also by an extra
stable eigenvalue, the asterisk denotes the case when all elements of ~ M are ¯xed to be zero.
C. Variance decompositions
Figures 10, 11 and 12 present variance decompositions under all three regimes for output, in-
°ation and the federal funds rate for horizons up to 25 months. For output, the variance
decompositions di®er little across determinacy regimes because for all three regimes demand
and technology shocks account for almost all of the forecast error variance. In contrast, in°a-
tion has a much di®erent variance decomposition under indeterminacy, as shown in Figure 11.
In°ation target shocks become much less important under indeterminacy because they largely
can be ignored when the Federal Reserve is passive about achieving any target. Interestingly,
monetary policy shocks play only a small role in in°ation's forecast variance at short horizons
under indeterminacy, but the share due to monetary policy shocks becomes greater at longer
horizons. Under indeterminacy, the sunspot shock contributes greatly to the variance of in°a-
tion, especially at short horizons. For the federal funds rate, as seen in Figure 12, the variance
decomposition is also much di®erent under indeterminacy. Monetary policy shocks account for
a much greater portion of interest rate variance at all horizons under indeterminacy, whereas de-
mand and technology shocks account for less. The e®ect of the sunspot shock is largely con¯ned
to in°ation, as the share of interest rate variance due to the sunspot shock is quite small.
D. Time-varying in°ation target
Our empirical estimates also provide results on how the time-varying in°ation target behaved
across the sample period. Figure 13 a) plots twelve-month moving averages of the deviation
of monthly in°ation from its long-run target (which is estimated to be 2:89 percent at an
annual rate in Table 2) and the posterior mean of the time-varying in°ation target. During
the indeterminacy period, the inferred in°ation target remained fairly low, in contrast to other
studies with time-varying in°ation targets that impose determinacy throughout the 1970s, such
20as Ireland (2005). In our model the persistently high in°ation of the 1970s is consistent with a
relatively low in°ation target. When monetary policy was too passive to drive in°ation toward
any particular target, the model inferred a target rate of in°ation near the unconditional mean.
During the Great In°ation, indeterminacy helps hold up the likelihood function because a high
in°ation target would have a very low probability density, given the low unconditional mean of
the in°ation target. In general, our results ¯t the story that in the Great In°ation the Federal
Reserve either countenanced a high in°ation target (a determinacy explanation) or adopted
a passive monetary policy rule in which the target rate of in°ation had little meaning (the
indeterminacy explanation).
Figure 13 b) plots the the 90 percent probability interval for the time-varying in°ation target.
It is perhaps surprising to see how closely the width of the probability interval matches the policy
determinacy regime periods. For this reason, we describe U.S. monetary policy as \less guided"
in the period of policy indeterminacy because it is simply harder to discern the target rate of
in°ation, without even considering whether the monetary policy rule is doing what is necessary
to achieve the target. It is also interesting to note that the width of the probability interval
for the in°ation target is somewhat wider in the second, post-1980 determinacy period. The
di®erence is in the two Taylor rules. Table 2 shows that the Taylor rule response coe±cient for





while the output gap response remained approximately the same in the second determinacy




2 ). These results show that the Federal Reserve has
made considerable progress in clarifying its in°ation objective since the 1970s, but there is room
for further improvement.
Figure 14 reports the time-varying in°ation target implied by the indeterminate policy rule
during the 1970s and a counterfactual in°ation target that the determinate rules would have
implied. The fact that the in°ation target required for determinacy in the 1970s is many standard
deviations above its mean indicates why the econometric inferences greatly favor indeterminacy
in the 1970s. The counterfactual analysis also shows why the public did not return to form
expectations based on a determinate policy rule until macroeconomic conditions were such that
the determinate Taylor rule with a low in°ation target was consistent with current interest rates.
21E. Consequences of sub-sample estimation
One bene¯t of the change-point model is that we have only one set of estimates of the deep
structural parameters (¿;·;¯;r¤, etc.). Thus when we compare impulse response functions and
variance decompositions across the determinacy and indeterminacy regimes, we do not have to
worry about whether the di®erences are coming from the regimes or from con°icting estimates
of the other structural parameters|the Keating (1990) critique.
In Table 3 we present a side-by-side comparison of sub-sample parameter estimates and the
full-sample estimates obtained using our change-point method. Note how the estimates of the
Phillips curve slope · go from 2.29 in pre-Volcker sub-sample to 4.54 in Volcker-Greenspan sub-
sample. The steady state rate of in°ation ¼¤ is estimated to be 4.89 at the Pre-Volcker period,
while considering only Post-1982 sub-sample results in ¼¤ of 2.36. If we add the volatile 1979-
1982 period, this value goes up to 2.86. Although other parameters, including the intertemporal
substitution elasticity ¿, do not change as dramatically as · and ¼¤, jointly these changes
could still have signi¯cant in°uence on the implied dynamics of the economy. This sub-sample
instability is also found in recursive estimates of DSGE models (Canova, 2005).
Figure 15 highlights the impact that discrepancies in sub-sample estimates have by com-
paring impulse responses implied by three di®erent sets of parameter estimates: the solid line
corresponds to the impulse responses implied by the full-sample estimates, while the two dotted
lines correspond to Pre-Volcker and Volcker-Greenspan sub-samples. By ¯xing monetary policy
response coe±cients Ã1 and Ã2 to the corresponding values from the second determinacy regime
D2, we ensure that the entire di®erence in impulse responses is accounted for by the discrep-
ancies in the sub-sample estimates of the deep structural parameters, and not the changes in
the monetary policy. In Figure 16 we conduct a similar exercise by comparing the impulse re-
sponses implied by full-sample with the Pre-Volcker period estimates, but this time Ã1 and Ã2
are ¯xed at their indeterminacy values, as estimated in our change-point model. The di®erences
in impulse responses under indeterminacy regime are even more pronounced than in Figure 15
under determinacy.
22VI. Conclusions
We extend Lubik and Schorfheide's (2004) likelihood-based estimation of dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models under indeterminacy to include time-varying monetary pol-
icy regimes which encompass sample periods of both determinacy and indeterminacy. With our
change-point approach, we are able to date the indeterminacy regime to lie between 1972 and
1982. Only when actual in°ation approached the neighborhood of the unconditional mean of
the in°ation target in 1982 did the inferred regime return to determinacy.
In contrast to LS (2004), we investigated a prior on indeterminacy-speci¯c parameters that
postulates that the e®ect of the sunspot shock on forecast errors is orthogonal to the e®ect
of fundamental shocks, as opposed to centering the prior where continuity of impulse response
functions at the boundary between determinacy and indeterminacy. The latter prior essentially
rules out the price puzzle under indeterminacy by forcing the impact response of in°ation to an
interest rate shock to be negative, as it is under determinacy. The orthogonal e®ects prior, in
contrast, allows the indeterminacy-speci¯c parameters to take whatever sign helps ¯t the data,
and those values imply the price puzzle under indeterminacy.
Thus, in contrast to a large and growing literature that treats the price puzzle as a false ¯nd-
ing to be excised through additional speci¯cation search and parameter restrictions, our results
suggest that the price puzzle could be a genuine phenomenon under the right circumstances: a
passive monetary policy that induces indeterminacy. In this way, our results bolster the ¯nding
from identi¯ed VARs estimated over sub-samples that the price puzzle is limited to samples that
focus largely on the 1970s. As the ¯rst estimated DSGE model to not only generate the price
puzzle but also estimate the time period when it occurred (which turns out to coincide closely
with the Great In°ation of the 1970s), we would suggest that the price puzzle is perhaps not a
false ¯nding to be `resolved' but possibly a consequence of indeterminacy.
Given the stark di®erences between the behavior of the economy under indeterminacy in the
1970s and determinacy in other time periods, our methodology for incorporating determinacy
regime shifts in estimated DSGE would prove useful in any monetary DSGE model where the
sample period includes the 1970s.
23APPENDIX
A. Coe±cient matrices and singular value decomposition
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where the data on annualized in°ation ¼t and the interest rate Rt can be expressed as the
corresponding steady state values plus 12 times their demeaned monthly counterparts. Note
that the output measure in vector yt does not require removal of a mean because we use Hodrick-
Prescott ¯ltered data, which is mean-zero by construction.
In order to estimate our DSGE model following the MCMC algorithm in section III, we
need to solve our linearized DSGE model in the form of equation (6) conditional on st at each
time t. We now consider details of the `DSGEsolve' function, where the state dependence is
implicit and it is suppressed in the interest of clarity. Following Sims (2002) we apply generalized
Schur QZ decomposition16 (¡0;¡1) = (Q0¤Z0;Q0­Z0) to partition the resulting system into two
parts: 1) the collection of non-explosive components denoted by subscript 1 and corresponding
to generalized eigenvalues (ratio of the diagonal elements of ­ over the corresponding diagonal
elements of ¤) that are less than one; 2) explosive components denoted by subscript 2 otherwise.
Then, we use \solution uniqueness" and \stability" conditions worked out in Sims (2002) to write



















































where w(t) = Z0®t, © = Q1¦(Q2¦)¡1 and I, 0 denote identity and zero matrices respectively
with dimensionality easily deduced from the above equation.
16See Golub and Van Loan (1996)

































































Finally, from LS (2003) and LS (2004) Proposition 1 we can solve for ´t as a function of shocks
and coe±cients ~ M = fMr;Mg;Mz;M¼g, which control the additional impact each fundamental
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It is important to point out that the singular value decomposition is unique only up to a sign
normalization. Therefore, some kind of sign identi¯cation restrictions on V2 are necessary to
ensure that under indeterminacy sign °ipping of the sunspot shock does not occur.
B. Detailed MCMC Algorithm
This paper follows the multiple change-point estimation approach originally introduced in Chib
(1998) based on results in Chib (1996). The centerpiece of this method is a transformation
in terms of a latent discrete state variable that indicates the regime from which a particular
observation has been drawn. In other words, instead of using a single-move sampler to draw
17Matrix dimensions are provided for the case of determinacy in this model.
26times t1 and t2 at which the structural break occurred, we will draw determinacy states sn =
fst 2 f0;1;2ggn
t=1 in a multi-move sampler, which is by far more e±cient than a single-move,
because it groups highly correlated elements of a Markov Chain in one block drastically reducing
autocorrelation of the draws.
Our objective is to draw from the posterior ¼(£;P;snjYn) which can be accomplished by
simulating the following full conditional distributions:




where we adapt the notation similar to Chib (1998): st = (s1;:::;st), st+1 = (st+1;:::;sn), ®1:n =
(®1;:::;®n), Yt = (y1;:::;yt) and use p(¢) to denote a discrete mass function, while ¼(¢) denotes
a density function of some random variable with one or more continuous components. To avoid
ambiguity we would like to emphasize the di®erence between the latent state of determinacy st
and the latent state variable ®t from the state-space model in equation (6).
Full details of each step of the MCMC algorithm follow:
1. Initialize £ and sn
2. The ¯rst block is sampled using method of composition in three parts. Sample P;£ and
®1:n from P;£;®1:njYn;sn by drawing
(a) P from PjYn;sn using a conjugate update. Let nii be the number of one-state
transitions from state i to state i (i.e. staying put). Then, a Bernoulli likelihood
p(snjpii) multiplied by the Beta prior ¼(pii) (given in subsection A) results in
piijsn » Beta(a + nii;b + 1); i = 0;1.
(b) £ from £jYn;sn using the Kalman ¯lter to ¯nd the target density and a Tailored
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to sample from it.
For convenience of notation, let t0 = 0, t1 and t2 be the time points of the ¯rst and
second structural breaks respectively, and t3 = n. Let ¼(£) denote the prior given in
Table 2. As discussed above, the likelihood function will di®er across states. There-
fore, conditional on state st at each time t we will call `DSGEsolve' function to cast it
27in the multivariate normal form of equation (6). In other words, in the implementation
of all the remaining steps of the algorithm, ¡¤
1(µ(st)) and ¡¤
2(µ(st); ~ M) are obtained
each time by calling the `DSGEsolve' function. Obviously, during implementation of
this algorithm, these coe±cients need to be computed only three times when looping
over t = 1;:::;n, because [¡¤
1(µ(st)) ¡¤
2(µ(st); ~ M)] = [¡¤
1(µ(st¡1)) ¡¤
2(µ(st¡1); ~ M)]
as long as st = st¡1.
By letting f(st) denote the Gaussian density function given all the states up to time t,
the density ¼(£jYn;sn;P) could be sampled using the usual Kalman ¯lter recursion
formula:

























tjt¡1)¡1(yt ¡ A ¡ B®
(st)
tjt¡1)]
where, suppressing the dependence on the states st for transparency, the details of
Kalman ¯lter updates are as follows:
1) state forecast mean ®tjt¡1 = ¡¤
1®t¡1jt¡1





3) data forecast variance ftjt¡1 = BPtjt¡1B0 + 0
4) Kalman gain Kt = Ptjt¡1B0f¡1
tjt¡1
5) update state mean ®tjt = ®tjt¡1 + Kt(yt ¡ A ¡ B®tjt¡1)
6) update state variance Ptjt = (I ¡ KtB)Ptjt¡1
The above equations require an initialization18 of ®t=0jt=0 and Pt=0jt=0, which are
18See Harvey (1988)
28set equal to their steady-state values.
Let m = f£g. The density g(m) = ¼(mjYn;sn;P) found in equation (12) serves
as a target density for the Tailored Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm originally
proposed by Chib and Greenberg (1994).19 First, using numerical optimization (a
GSL implementation of BFGS algorithm), we ¯nd m¤ = argmax
m
ln(g(m)). Then, we
compute the Fisher information matrix V = f¡@2 ln(g(m))=@m@m0g¡1 evaluated for
m = m¤. The proposal density is based on (m¤;V) and is speci¯ed as a multivariate
t-distribution with » degrees of freedom serving as a tuning parameter. This step is










The current value of m is retained if the proposed value is rejected. We have dis-
covered that a constant proposal density found using the above procedure for some
reasonable ¯xed sn produces a good acceptance rate (76%) and reliable mixing results
(see ine±ciency factors in Table 2). This observation has substantially reduced total
MCMC computing time and allowed us to make 10,000 draws in about 10 minutes
with low ine±ciency factors.
(c) ®1:n from ®1:njYn;£;sn. Conditional on sn, we are faced with a simple linear
Gaussian state-space model with time-varying coe±cients. The standard approach is
to draw ®1:n using one-period smoothing, which amounts to adding two more steps
to the Kalman ¯lter procedure above:
7) Mt = Ptjt(¡¤
1)0(Pt+1jt)¡1
8) Ptjt+1 = Ptjt ¡ MtPt+1jt(Mt)0
and then sampling the states backwards starting with
®n » N(®njn;Pnjn)
followed by (8t = n ¡ 1;:::1)
®t » N(®tjt+1;Ptjt+1); where ®tjt+1 = ®tjt + Mt(®t+1 ¡ ¡¤
1®tjt).
19See Chib (2001) for discussion of various MH algorithms and their tuning
29However, several technical complications occur as a result of degeneracy of the state
space model in (6). In particular, in case of (in)determinacy, one can sample only
one (two) element(s) of the state vector and, computing three more elements from
the observed data points, solve for the remaining four (three) elements such that the
integrity of the transition equation of the SSM was preserved at all times. Let us
de¯ne a matrix C that horizontally concatenates the last two columns of the matrix
¡¤
1 with the matrix ¡¤
2. The structure of our SSM model is such that in the case
of determinacy the rank(C) is always equal to 4 and for indeterminacy it is 5. The
idea is to ¯nd some weighting matrix W which would allow us to use the ¯rst three
elements of the state vector, which are observed given ¼¤ and r¤, and the sampled
fourth (and ¯fth) element(s) of ®t+1 to ¯nd the remaining four (three) elements in
case of (in)determinacy:
®t+1(5 : 8) = ¡¤
1(5 : 8;:)®t + W[®t+1(1 : 4) ¡ ¡¤
1(1 : 4;:)®t]
Let us de¯ne C1 = C(1 : 4;:) to be the ¯rst four rows of C matrix (¯ve for indeter-























Breakpoints between regimes also required some special treatment. All additional
technical details are available from authors upon request.
3. Following Chib (1998), in the second block we sample sn from snjYn;£;P;®1:n by drawing
st backwards from time t = n ¡ 1 conditional on st+1. Chib (1996) has shown that
p(stjYn;st+1;£;P;®1:n) / p(stjYt;£;P;®1:n)p(st+1jst;P;®1:n)
where p(st+1jst;P;®1:n) = pstst+1
30Starting with t = 1, Chib (1998) utilizes a recursive forward calculation to ¯nd the mass
function p(stjYt;£;P;®1:n)=p(stjYt;£;P;®1:t¡1) (8t = 1;:::;n) by recursively trans-
forming p(st¡1jYt¡1;£;P;®1:t¡2) through:
p(st = kjYt;£;P;®1:t¡1) =
p(st = kjYt¡1;£;P;®1:t¡2)f(st=k)(ytj£;st = k;®1:t¡1)
Pm
l=1 p(st = ljYt¡1;£;P;®1:t¡2)f(st=l)(ytj£;st = l;®1:t¡1)
where p(st = kjYt¡1;£;P;®1:t¡2) =
Pk
l=k¡1 plk £ p(st¡1 = ljYt¡1;£;P;®1:t¡2) and
f(st=l)(ytj£;st = l;®1:t¡1) =
N(ytjA + B(¡¤
1(µ(st = l))®t¡1);B¡¤
2(µ(st = l); ~ M)­(¡¤
2(µ(st = l); ~ M))0B0) using the
fact that ®1:n is treated as known in this block, which is e®ectively reduced to a linear
regression with change point coe±cients model where ®1:n serve as explanatory variables.
C. Computation of Impulse Response Functions




Figures 6, 7, and 8 display Impulse Responses IRj(st = i) to one-standard-deviation shocks
0 · j · 24 periods ahead given determinacy state st = i (i = 0;1;2), which are calculated using
the following formula:





2(µ(st = i); ~ M)Cholesky(­)
D. Computation of Variance Decomposition
Let irl
j(st = i) denote l'th column of j-period ahead Impulse Response IRj(st = i) given
determinacy state i. Then, the contribution of shock l to the mean squared error of the j-period
ahead state variable forecast is
irl
0(st = i)(irl
0(st = i))0 + irl
1(st = i)(irl
1(st = i))0 + ¢¢¢ + irl
j¡1(st = i)(irl
j¡1(st = i))0
31E. Tables and Figures
MCMC Parameter Estimates
Model Posterior Ine®. Prior
Parameter Mean St. Dev. 90% Prob. Int. Factor Density Mean St. Dev.
¿ 0.4696 0.1004 (0.3064, 0.6399) 1.5 gamma 0.53 0.14
¯ 0.9918 0.0041 (0.9847, 0.9981) 2.7 gamma 0.99 0.005
· 2.4762 0.5683 (1.5443, 3.4345) 3.2 gamma 1.50 1.40
½R 0.8688 0.0137 (0.8457, 0.8911) 3.0 beta 0.60 0.20
½g 0.9866 0.0055 (0.9775, 0.9956) 4.3 beta 0.80 0.15
½¼ 0.85 ¯xed
½z 0.9683 0.0065 (0.9576, 0.9794) 3.7 beta 0.80 0.15
¼¤ 2.8942 0.3186 (2.3618, 3.4143) 2.4 normal 4.00 2.00
r¤ 2.4579 0.4368 (1.7294, 3.1572) 2.5 normal 2.00 1.00
¾R 0.0590 0.0029 (0.0542, 0.0638) 2.7 invgamma 0.10 0.10
¾z 0.7602 0.0235 (0.7215, 0.7982) 4.0 invgamma 0.80 0.30
¾g 0.0271 0.0047 (0.0190, 0.0348) 3.8 invgamma 0.04 0.03
¾¼ 0.05 ¯xed
¾³ 0.1727 0.0131 (0.1507, 0.1944) 4.4 invgamma 0.25 0.13
½gz 0.9243 0.0307 (0.8727, 0.9747) 4.7 normal 0.30 0.70
Mr -0.4653 0.3146 (-0.973, 0.0611) 3.1 normal 0.00 1.00
Mg -0.1977 0.9998 (-1.869, 1.4313) 2.5 normal 0.00 1.00
Mz -0.1902 0.0585 (-0.286, -0.097) 2.6 normal 0.00 1.00
M¼ -0.2288 0.9831 (-1.840, 1.3747) 3.2 normal 0.00 1.00
Ã
(0)
1 3.9317 0.4934 (3.1201, 4.7842) 3.6 normal 2.30 1.50
Ã
(1)
1 0.4985 0.1429 (0.2652, 0.7321) 4.6 normal 0.40 0.20
Ã
(2)
1 2.3724 0.2222 (2.0101, 2.7400) 3.0 normal 2.30 0.60
Ã
(0)
2 0.3088 0.1014 (0.1416, 0.4821) 4.3 normal 0.30 0.12
Ã
(1)
2 0.2967 0.0991 (0.1351, 0.4626) 1.8 normal 0.30 0.12
Ã
(2)
2 0.3144 0.0987 (0.1534, 0.4760) 2.2 normal 0.30 0.12
Table 2: Monthly data parameter estimates using 10,000 MH iterations and 10% burn-in
































































































































































Figure 5. Prior-Posterior Update: Dotted blue line depicts the prior and solid red line the posterior of indeter-
minacy region-determined parameters
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(a) monetary policy shock
Impulse Response of Output to Demand 
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Figure 6. Impulse Responses: mean (solid) and 90% probability interval (dash).
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Figure 7. Impulse Responses: mean (solid) and 90% probability interval (dash).
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Figure 8. Impulse Responses to sunspot shock: mean (solid) and 90% probability interval (dash).
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Figure 9. Impulse Responses obtained by forcing the \continuity" restriction on M, which precludes the price
puzzle
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Figure 10. Variance Decomposition: percent of variance in output with 90% probability interval (dash)
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Figure 11. Variance Decomposition: percent of variance in in°ation with 90% probability interval (dash)
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Figure 12. Variance Decomposition: percent of variance in interest rate with 90% probability interval (dash)




(a) twelve-month moving average









(b) 90% probability interval width
Figure 13. In°ation Target: graph a) depicts the evolution of the estimated demeaned monthly in°ation target
(blue line) and demeaned monthly actual in°ation (red line); graph b) shows the width of the estimated in°a-







Figure 14. Counterfactual analysis: twelve-month moving averages of the actual annual in°ation (dash-dot
blue), inferred mean in°ation target from the full model (dotted red), and counterfactual mean in°ation target
inferred by imposing D1 regime (solid green).
43Parameter Change-Point Pre-Volcker Post-1982 Volcker-Greenspan
¿ 0.4696 0.5464 0.4417 0.5548
¯ 0.9918 0.9925 0.9925 0.9925
· 2.4762 2.2935 1.8509 4.5362
½R 0.8688 0.9585 0.9456 0.7750
½g 0.9866 0.9742 0.9844 0.9835
½z 0.9683 0.9623 0.9650 0.9690
¼¤ 2.8942 4.8933 2.3626 2.8581
r¤ 2.4579 1.1889 1.7959 2.2070
¾r 0.0590 0.0311 0.0264 0.0973
¾z 0.7602 0.9330 0.5034 0.5780
¾g 0.0271 0.0387 0.0183 0.0278
¾³ 0.1727 0.1326 - -
½gz 0.9243 0.9735 0.9300 0.8374
M³;r -0.4653 -0.0139 - -
M³;g -0.1977 -0.0128 - -
M³;z -0.1902 -0.2528 - -
M³;¼ -0.2288 -0.5825 - -
Ã
(0)
1 3.9317 - - -
Ã
(1)
1 0.4985 0.4078 - -
Ã
(2)
1 2.3724 - 2.7410 2.6123
Ã
(0)
2 0.3088 - - -
Ã
(1)
2 0.2967 0.2982 - -
Ã
(2)
2 0.3144 - 0.3191 0.2957
Table 3: Monthly data parameter estimates using the entire period 1959:02-2005:04 and three
sub-samples: 1959:02-1979:06, 1982:10-2005:04, 1979:07-2005:04, corresponding to Pre-Volcker,
Post-1982, and Volcker-Greenspan periods respectively. Following the sub-sample ¯ndings of LS
(2004), Pre-Volcker period was estimated by imposing indeterminacy, while both Post-1982 and
Volcker-Greenspan periods were estimated for determinacy regime.
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Figure 15. Impulse Responses under Determinacy: the solid line corresponds to the impulse responses generated
from parameter estimates found using the entire data set while dotted lines correspond to parameter estimates
obtained from Pre-Volcker and Volcker-Greenspan sub-samples. The response coe±cients of the monetary policy
were ¯xed at the level of change-point estimates for regime D2 to ensure that the only di®erence in impulse
responses comes from the discrepancy in the estimates of the deep structural parameters across these sub-samples.
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Figure 16. Impulse Responses under Indeterminacy: the solid line corresponds to the impulse responses generated
from parameter estimates found using the entire data set while the dotted line corresponds to parameter estimates
obtained from the Pre-Volcker sub-sample. The response coe±cients of the monetary policy were ¯xed at the
level of change-point estimates for regime IND to ensure that the only di®erence in impulse responses comes
from the discrepancy in the estimates of the deep structural parameters between the sub-sample and full-sample
inference.
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